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In her book, Marlene Laruelle – the Director and Research Professor at the 
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the George 
Washington University (Washington, DC) – discusses the multilayered and 
multifaceted nature of Russian nationalism as (1) a way to imagine the nation, 
(2) the set of doctrines and ideologies, and (3) a political movement. She begins 
with a review of Western scholarship on Russian nationalism as a independent 
research field with the following main directions: nineteenth-century Russian 
political philosophy with its special attention towards the so-called “Russian 
idea”; the revival of Russian nationalism in late Soviet times; the “dual”-nature 
nationalism in the post-Soviet period with fluctuations from being an indicator of 
reactionaries rejecting democratic changes to a form of official state policy. The 
conducted study allows Laruelle to make the following conclusions: first, “the 
Western – in particular US – field of Russian Studies has been deeply molded 
by the state of the US–Russia relationship”; second, “in Western discourses, 
Russia’s evolutions tend to be systematically interpreted in terms of what they 
mean for Russia’s place on the international scene and its relationship with 
the West”, thus missing the interpretation of Russia as “a conglomerate of 
diverse groups and institutions with largely decentralized voices and agendas”; 
third, “the study of ‘Russian nationalism’ is still marked by a prism of Russian 
exceptionality”, thus missing the comparative perspective; fourth, “priority has 
always been given to the ideological content of ‘Russian nationalism’ over its 
social construction”; fifth, studies often “aim to produce an easy, unidirectional 
mapping” of nationalism, thus losing sight on its polyphonic nature; finally, 
“Russian nationalism” is mainly seen as a political ideology, thus missing that 
nationalism is also expressed “in the intellectual, cultural, and communication 
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worlds”, as well as in “banal nationalism” of “folk culture, everyday habits, and 
routines grounded in common sense” (pp. 6–8). 
In accordance with the title, the book contains three parts. In Part I (“Nationalism 
as imperial imaginary”) Laruelle focuses on several features of the imaginary realm 
of Russian nationalism – cosmism, geographical metanarratives and alternate 
history – which could not be considered as typical characteristics, especially in 
comparison with “traditional” research stereotypes such as Russian socio-cultural 
exceptionality proclaimed by past and present Russian scholars. Laruelle provides 
a comprehensive analysis of Russian cosmism as a common ground for post-Soviet 
Russian nationalisms (p. 34), starting from its roots in German Romantic philosophy 
of the nineteenth century through the concept of All-Unity (Vseedinstvo) and the 
Russian intellectual tradition of the Silver Age, to Nikolai Fiodorov’s and Konstantin 
Tsiolkovskii’s cosmic utopia of the 1930s. In addition, she considers cosmism as a 
specific form of occultism, although with some major differences: 
Cosmism awaits the re-animation of humanity into a single universal organism – 
and the conjunction between two adjectives, single and universal, is a sign 
of totalitarian thought – whereas occultism sketches a world of awakening 
filled with multiple, diverse, specific individualities, each one of which has, 
via different paths, formed its consciousness of the harmony of man and the 
cosmos” (p. 31).
Such a statement, although attractive by itself, seems to be under-elaborated; 
it is worthwhile to note that the chapter devoted to cosmism looks slightly alien 
to the following chapters devoted to geographical metanarratives and alternative 
histories. There Laruelle stresses that, for many centuries, the territorial size and 
location in space have served as the justification of Russia’s mission in the world; 
however, today’s resentment about the diminished space of Russia compared 
with imperial and Soviet past becomes “a fundamental driver of these present-day 
narratives” (p. 38). Laruelle gives prominence to three types of such narratives: 
first, Russia as a specific continent (Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism), which is 
aimed at rejecting “Atlanticist” domination and stating that Russia–Eurasia is the 
only possible driver of today’s multipolar world; second, the unique relationship 
between the Russian nation and the cosmos (Cosmism), which legitimizes the 
idea about the cosmos as a natural extension of the Russian territory (which looks 
rather unsubstantiated); third, the Arctic region as a potential fore-post for twenty-
first century Russia (Arctism), which is seen as a crucial element in the revival of 
Russia’s great-power status. Laruelle emphasizes several common traits of these 
three narratives: their proponents derive ideas from the underground counterculture 
of late Soviet times. These ideas are built, on one hand, on resentment and, on the 
other, on keeping promises of better days ahead. The narratives not only rest on the 
assumptions of previous intellectual traditions, but also receive an updated version: 
“Eurasianism is presented as an example of multipolarity and regional economic 
integration; Cosmism has been rebranded by linking spatial conquest with Russia’s 
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need for modernization and high technology; and Arctism applies to both new 
quests for energy resources and the concern with preserving the planet’s fragile 
ecosystems” (p. 50). 
Laruelle argues that alternative interpretations of history – so-called “memory 
wars” (about 1941–45 Great Patriotic War in particular) – and constant rewritings of 
pre-revolutionary and Soviet history are widespread in today’s Russia as a means of 
understanding the present through the past. Alternative histories indicate the decline 
of the Marxist historical metanarrative, which has resulted in the revolt of alternate 
historians against academic specialists and their exclusive right “to draw the line 
between truth and lies” (p. 55), as well as in the attempts to diminish the trauma caused 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union; that is why alternative histories are closely linked 
to conspiracy theories concerning the struggle against Russia led by internal and 
external enemies. Analyzing in depth the past and present alternative histories, such 
as various nationalist historiographies, the “Jewish question”, the “New Chronology” 
movement, etc., Laruelle highlights their commercial nature and notes their “indirect 
influence on the university milieus”, in particular, such academic disciplines as 
culturology, geopolitics, ethno-politology, and others (p. 66). Commenting on the 
Russian public’s perception of the alternative histories, Laruelle mentions a particular 
sensitivity towards the postmodern question of personalizing the historical narrative, 
which results in the “right of each individual to create his own national and world 
history” (ibid.) as a form of symbolic compensation for the post-Soviet trauma.
Part II “Nationalism as a doctrine” begins with an analysis of Aryanism as an 
alternative attempt to prove Russia’s full identification with Europe. Laruelle considers 
Aryanism as a form of “white” racism very similar to the ideology, which has spread in 
Europe and the United States. She also explores some types of neo-paganism and 
esoteric practices, which have become quite popular in Russia in recent decades. 
Considering various far-right doctrines and their promoters, Laruelle focuses on 
the most famous of them, namely, Aleksandr Dugin as “the main manufacturer of a 
neofacism à la russe that is both within and outside the circles of power” (p. 95), whom 
she characterizes as the aggregator of doctrines from diverse origins, particularly, 
esoteric Nazism, Traditionalism and the European New Right (p. 96). Following 
an in-depth analysis of Dugin’s ideas, Laruelle raises two important questions: Is 
the promotion of fascism in Russia being successful? Can Dugin be considered a 
mainstream thinker? She gives negative answer to both these questions and notes that 
Dugin has succeeded in promoting Russia’s great power and its leading role in Eurasia, 
interpreting the Soviet Union’s messianism, and referring to conservative values as 
Russia’s own identity; “but he has failed to anchor new ideological toolkits – be they 
esoteric Nazism, Guénon’s and Evola’s Traditionalism, or the German Conservative 
Revolution – in Russian public opinion or in the minds of decision-makers” (p. 124). 
However, in spite of labelling Dugin as a marginal figure, the chapter devoted to him 
is the longest in the book. The final chapter of Part II analyses the phenomenon of 
Izborskii Club – a large group of Russian and foreign conservative experts, where 
Laruelle indicates its three main contexts: planting government/oligarch sponsored 
think tanks, defence of so-called traditional values, and aggressive nationalism. 
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Part III – “Nationalism as political battlefield” – describes three main actors of 
political Russian nationalism in three generations: classic far-right groups; National 
Democrats supporting the European-inspired populist ethnonationalism; and the 
resurgent militia groups connected with the expansion of “Novorossiya”, as well 
as the actors’ ambivalent relationship with state powers due to the unclear legal 
definition of “extremism” and Kremlin’s intention to consider “everything related to 
Russian nationalism as a potential rival for legitimacy, and therefore as something it 
should bring ‘under control’” (p. 171). Characterizing changing faces of the far-rights – 
Russian National Unity (Russkoe natsional’noe edinstvo, RNE), National Bolshevik 
Party (Natsional-bolshevistskaia partiia, NBP), skinheads (britogolovye), anti-migrant 
movement, etc., Laruelle underlines that all of them display typical fascist elements: 
the cult of the leader; the white racism; the celebration of violence; the belief in 
a widespread plot against Russia that unites enemies of all kinds; the exaltation of 
military and paramilitary actions, and doctrines calling for a reactionary revolution, 
etc. (p. 156). Nevertheless, she concludes, “yet one critical feature has remained 
relatively stable over time: a direct embrace of historical fascism or national socialism 
systematically provokes rejection from the Russian public and therefore marginalizes 
those who claim it” (p. 170). 
The next chapter of Part III is devoted to the popular political activist Alexei 
Navalny along with other National Democrats (Natsdems) who combine pro-Western 
liberal narratives with ethnic nationalism and virulent xenophobia – the characteristic, 
which may look confusing for Western audience (p. 174). Laruelle proves that Navalny 
does not see any contradiction between democracy and nationalism because, for him, 
the term russkii has a civic, rather than ethnic, connotation. Nevertheless, his position 
concerning the annexation of Crimea remains ambiguous, as well as framing North 
Caucasians (Chechnya in particular) as archaic and alien to Russian culture, and the 
call for the introduction of a visa regime with the Republics of Central Asia in order 
to control the migration. Thus, “his stance and actions may be labeled democratic, 
but not liberal. He believes in democracy as a form of government…, but his liberal 
convictions are less easy to capture… Navalny considers that demos – the citizenry – 
should also be ethnos – the primordial group” (p. 189). In general, Laruelle concludes, 
National Democrats “have failed to offer a concept of civic belonging to the nation that 
does not reproduce the classic clichés of Russian nationalism. They do not know how 
to articulate a liberalism that is founded on individual rights and a nationalism that 
believes in essentialized collective identities” (p. 191). 
The final chapter of Part III explores the concept of Novorossiya (the self-
name of parts of the Eastern Ukraine) as a “live mythmaking process”, which is 
characterized by the convergence of three competing but partly overlapping 
paradigms. The first paradigm is “post-Soviet” labelled by Laruelle as “red”, since it 
emphasizes the memory of the Soviet Union “in promoting a large unified territory, 
great-powerness, opposition to the West, and a socialist mission” (p. 197). The 
second paradigm is motivated by political Orthodoxy traditionally symbolized by 
“white” colour (in reference to the White movement of 1918–1921), in which Orthodox 
Christianity is seen “as a civilizational principle that makes Russia a distinct country 
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with strong religious values that should shape the theocratic nature of the regime” 
(p. 201). The third paradigm (labelled as “brown”) is borrowed from the European 
fascist tradition and claims that Novorossiya will be the battleground “where Aryan 
supremacy could defeat Europe’s decadence, and where young people could 
be trained in urban warfare to prepare to overthrow the regimes in power across 
Europe” (p. 208). 
In the book, Laruelle limits herself to studying nationalism as an ideological 
doctrine and as a political movement, which is not directly sponsored by the state. 
Thus, she argues, “the Russian state cannot be termed ‘nationalist’”, although 
interacting with various state actors at many levels (p. 9), and nationalism could hardly 
be interpreted as the mainstream ideological trend. Laruelle provides a detailed and 
accurate depiction of the events, which have taken place in Russia over the past 
twenty years. In general, the readers of the book might enjoy not only its content, but 
also its form. The structure of the book represents a perfect harmony: the title contains 
three concepts, the book has three parts each divided into three chapters, and in most 
of them three main arguments are discussed. 
